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In recent years, Bayesian learning models have been applied to an increasing va-
riety of domains. While such models have been criticized on theoretical grounds,
the underlying assumptions and predictions are rarely made concrete and tested
experimentally. Here, I use Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) Bayesian model of rule-
learning as a case study to spell out the underlying assumptions, and to confront
them with the empirical results Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) propose to simulate,
as well as with novel experiments. While rule-learning is arguably well suited to
rational Bayesian approaches, I show that their models are neither psychologically
plausible nor ideal observer models. Further, I show that their central assumption
is unfounded: humans do not always preferentially learn more specific rules, but,
at least in some situations, those rules that happen to be more salient. Even when
granting the unsupported assumptions, I show that all of the experiments modeled by
Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) either contradict their models, or have a large number
of more plausible interpretations. I provide an alternative account of the experimen-
tal data based on simple psychological mechanisms, and show that this account both
describes the data better, and is easier to falsify. I conclude that, despite the recent
surge in Bayesian models of cognitive phenomena, psychological phenomena are best
understood by developing and testing psychological theories rather than models that
can be fit to virtually any data.
To recognize the taste of an apple, do we automati-
cally think about the tastes of oranges as well as all
other foods before we can know that we are eating an
apple? According to a growing literature of Bayesian
models, we make inferences (e.g., the kind of food we
are tasting) by considering all possible situations (e.g.,
tasting apples, oranges etc.) in addition to the situation
we actually face, and then decide which of these situa-
tions is the most likely one. Bayesian inference models
have been claimed to account for an impressive variety of
cognitive phenomena, including visual grouping (Orba´n,
Fiser, Aslin, & Lengyel, 2008), action understanding
(Baker, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2009), concept learning
and categorization (Anderson, 1991; Goodman, Tenen-
baum, Feldman, & Griffiths, 2008), (inductive) reason-
ing (Goodman, Ullman, & Tenenbaum, 2011; Griffiths &
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Tenenbaum, 2009; Kemp, Perfors, & Tenenbaum, 2007;
Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009; Kemp, Tenenbaum, Niyogi,
& Griffiths, 2010; Lu, Yuille, Liljeholm, Cheng, &
Holyoak, 2008; Oaksford & Chater, 1994; Te´gla´s et al.,
2011), judgment about real-world quantities (Griffiths &
Tenenbaum, 2006), word learning (Frank, Goodman, &
Tenenbaum, 2009; Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007), word seg-
mentation (Frank, Goldwater, Griffiths, & Tenenbaum,
2010), and grammar acquisition (Perfors, Tenenbaum, &
Wonnacott, 2010; Perfors, Tenenbaum, & Regier, 2011).
Despite this growing literature, various authors have
criticized Bayesian approaches on theoretical grounds
(Altmann, 2010; Bowers & Davis, 2012; Fitelson, 1999;
Jones & Love, 2011; Marcus, 2010; Sakamoto, Jones,
& Love, 2008), and where Bayesian approaches have
been explicitly compared to psychological models (e.g.,
in the case of causal inference), the non-Bayesian ap-
proaches typically explained the data better (e.g., Bes,
Sloman, Lucas, & Raufaste, 2012; Fernbach & Slo-
man, 2009). Here, I add to this literature by taking
a model in a domain that appears particularly suitable
for Bayesian learning — rule induction, spell out its un-
derlying assumptions as well as their predictions, and
confront them with empirical data. Specifically, Frank
and Tenenbaum (2011) recently proposed that infants
acquire rules in Bayesian, optimal ways. I will compare
this approach with an account of rule-learning based on
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simple, psychologically grounded mechanisms, and show
that the latter approach provides a principled explana-
tion for the data.
Bayesian approaches to
cognition: what is optimal?
On a conceptual level, Bayesian inference is straight-
forward. For example, if we encounter an individual
with a Red Sox cap, we conclude that she is more likely
to come from Boston than from, say, New York. How-
ever, to draw this conclusion, we use our knowledge that
the likelihood of somebody wearing a Red Sox cap is
higher in Boston than in New York. Bayesian calcu-
lations allow us to turn the likelihood that somebody
who is in Boston wears a Red Sox cap into the likeli-
hood that somebody who wears a Red Sox cap is from
Boston. Moreover, such calculations make“optimal”use
of the available information.
Despite its conceptual simplicity, Bayesian inference
is tremendously useful in domains from statistics (e.g.,
Gill, 2008; O’Hagan, 1994) to evolutionary biology
(e.g., Huelsenbeck, Ronquist, Nielsen, & Bollback, 2001;
Pagel, 1994). Further, natural selection can be for-
mulated as a Bayesian optimization problem; as a re-
sult, Bayesian inference has given us important insights
into the evolution of our mental abilities. For exam-
ple, some researchers have shown that perceptual and
cognitive mechanisms might be well adapted to the
statistics of our natural environment (e.g., Brunswik &
Kamiya, 1953; Elder & Goldberg, 2002; Geisler & Diehl,
2002, 2003; Sigman, Cecchi, Gilbert, & Magnasco, 2001;
Weiss, Simoncelli, & Adelson, 2002).
However, when it comes to Bayesian models of learn-
ing and cognition, environmental statistics are generally
lacking, forcing such models to be much more specula-
tive and hard to verify. This problem follows directly
from Bayesian claims to make “optimal” use of informa-
tion in the environment, and our lack of understanding
of what has been optimized over the course and under
the constraints of evolution. In fact, not all behavioral
traits are optimal, but some might simply be accidents of
how a species has evolved. For example, in some monog-
amous animals such as Zebra finches, females seek extra-
pair copulations although this behavior is maladaptive
for females. However, extrapair mating behavior might
be selected for in females because it might be affected
by an allele that is shared with males, for whom sir-
ing extrapair offspring is adaptive (Forstmeier, Martin,
Bolund, Schielzeth, & Kempenaers, 2011). Hence, the
seemingly maladaptive behavior might be due to the
accidents of how this trait is encoded genetically, sug-
gesting that it is extremely difficult to assess whether
our cognitive mechanisms are optimal and, if so, what
they have been optimized for.
An overview over Frank and
Tenenbaum’s (2011) models
Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) model is representa-
tive of a large number of similar models, and is applied
to a domain that is arguably well-suited to Bayesian ap-
proaches. (Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) present in fact
three different models, but I will present the differences
between these models as they become relevant for the
current purposes.) They raise the question of how young
infants learn rule-like patterns based on repetitions. For
example, syllable triplets like ba-li-li follow an ABB pat-
tern, where the last syllable is repeated; syllable triplets
like ba-ba-li follow an AAB pattern, where the first syl-
lable is repeated. Following Marcus, Vijayan, Rao, and
Vishton’s (1999) seminal demonstration that young in-
fants can learn such patterns, repetition-patterns have
become an important testing ground for rule-learning,
both in humans (e.g., Dawson & Gerken, 2009; Endress,
Dehaene-Lambertz, & Mehler, 2007; Endress, Scholl,
& Mehler, 2005; Frank, Slemmer, Marcus, & Johnson,
2009; Gerken, 2010; Go´mez & Gerken, 1999; Kova´cs &
Mehler, 2008, 2009a; Marcus, Fernandes, & Johnson,
2007; Saffran, Pollak, Seibel, & Shkolnik, 2007) and in
nonhuman animals (e.g., Giurfa, Zhang, Jenett, Menzel,
& Srinivasan, 2001; Hauser & Glynn, 2009; Murphy,
Mondragon, & Murphy, 2008).
According to Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) model,
infants try to figure out the “best” rule describing the
stimuli they perceive. To do so, they come equipped
with an innate inventory of elementary rules, and check
whether what they hear (or see) is compatible with all
of the rules in their inventory. For example, if they
hear AAB triplets, they would not only think about
AAB patterns, but also about ABB patterns and all
other patterns Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) incorpo-
rated into their model, even if they never hear any of
these alternative patterns. To choose a rule, Frank and
Tenenbaum (2011) propose that infants assume that the
probability that a stimulus has been generated by a rule
is inversely proportional to the total number of stimuli
that can be generated by the rule (equations 2 and 3 in
their first model; the other models make similar assump-
tions); this strategy has been called the size principle by
Tenenbaum and Griffiths (2001).
Concretely, infants might encounter the triplets pu-li-
li and ba-pu-pu, both following an ABB pattern. Hence,
they encounter a total vocabulary of three syllables (i.e.,
pu, li and ba). According to Frank and Tenenbaum
(2011), infants know (i) that the three syllables allow
for a total of 3× 3× 3 = 27 triplets; (ii) that 6 of these
triplets follow an ABB pattern; and (iii) that 3 of these
triplets follow an AAA pattern (where all three syllables
are identical), even though infants have never heard any
AAA triplets; infants know the number of triplets that
are compatible with any other conceivable rule.
As a result, irrespective of any Bayesian computa-
tions, infants know that AAA patterns are a priori more
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unlikely than ABB patterns, because there are fewer
potential AAA triplets than ABB triplets. According
to Frank and Tenenbaum (2011), infants use this knowl-
edge to infer patterns. That is, if they hear stimuli that
are equally consistent with multiple patterns, they opt
for the pattern that is a priori more unlikely, and harder
to conform to. Below, I will refer to patterns that are
harder to conform to as the more “specific” patterns.
An alternative view:
rule-learning based on
perceptual or memory
primitives
Before reviewing Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011)
models in detail, I will briefly outline an alternative ap-
proach to rule-learning, based on perceptual or mem-
ory primitives (e.g., Endress et al., 2005, 2007; Endress,
Nespor, & Mehler, 2009; see also Marcus, 2008, for a
similar approach). Specifically, previous empirical work
suggests that humans (and other animals) are equipped
with a “repetition-detector” that is sensitive to repeated
elements in a sequence. For example, in a sequence such
as “pulili,” this detector would note the repetition of
the syllable “li.” Presumably, this detector works best
when the repeated elements are adjacent (as in ABB
patterns), is still operative with one intervening item
between the repeated items (as in ABA patterns, even
though such patterns are harder to learn than ABB
patterns; Gervain, Macagno, Cogoi, Pen˜a, & Mehler,
2008; Kova´cs & Mehler, 2009b), and might fail to de-
tect the repeated items when the intervening items are
too numerous (e.g., in ABCDEFGHIJ. . .A patterns).
However, it is still unknown how repetition-detection
depends on the number of intervening items or the in-
tervening time between two repeated items.
Further, humans are equipped with a second mech-
anism that allows them to learn the sequence elements
that occur in the edges of sequences; for example, it is
easy to note that “pulidi” and “ranodi” both end with
“di.” Of course, humans are endowed with many other
mechanisms, but these two mechanisms suffice to ex-
plain most of the data below.
In addition to these mechanisms, I make the follow-
ing assumptions. First, when learning occurs over time,
learning performance will generally be better with more
exposure or more opportunities to learn than with less
exposure or fewer opportunities to learn (e.g., Ebbing-
haus, 1885/1913). Second, when participants are more
interested in stimuli, and attend more to them, they
might learn better. One way to make stimuli more in-
teresting might be to use species-specific vocalizations,
i.e., speech.
Third, when a stimulus is compatible with multiple
rules that each can be learned in isolation, participants
will learn all of them, and expect items to conform to
them. However, some rules will be more salient and
easier to learn than others; as a result, violations of
these rules might be more salient than violations of less
salient rules. However, which rules are salient and easy
to learn is an empirical question (an assumption that
is shared with some Bayesian models; see e.g., Frank &
Goodman, 2012), and provides important constraints on
our rule-learning abilities as well as on the underlying
mechanisms.
Fourth, to explain Kova´cs and Mehler’s (2009a) data,
I simply refer to Kova´cs and Mehler’s (2009a) own inter-
pretation that bilinguals have enhanced executive func-
tion compared to monolinguals (e.g., Bialystok, 1999;
Bialystok & Martin, 2004; Bialystok, Craik, Klein, &
Viswanathan, 2004; Bialystok, Craik, & Luk, 2008; Bi-
alystok & Craik, 2010; Costa, Herna´ndez, & Sebastia´n-
Galle´s, 2008; Kova´cs & Mehler, 2009b; Kova´cs, 2009).
While this issue is most likely orthogonal to rule-
learning per se, I will discuss it below because Frank
and Tenenbaum (2011) claimed that their rule-learning
models provided an alternative interpretation to Kova´cs
and Mehler’s (2009a) data as well as for performance
differences between monolinguals and bilinguals in the
Stroop task.
Fifth, there are developmental differences on which
this account (and, for that matter, Frank and Tenen-
baum’s (2011) account) is completely silent. For exam-
ple, young infants can detect repetition-patterns in mu-
sical stimuli (Dawson & Gerken, 2009), lose this ability
a few months later (Dawson & Gerken, 2009; Marcus
et al., 2007), and detect such patterns again in adult-
hood (Endress et al., 2007). However, the experiential
or maturational processes responsible for this pattern of
results are unclear, and might be related to the devel-
opment of language, music cognition or other cognitive
faculties (see Dawson & Gerken, 2009, for discussion).
Some general problems of
Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011)
model
Before reassessing whether Frank and Tenenbaum’s
(2011) models account for the data they proposed to
simulate, I will provide some general criticisms of their
models that are shared by many other Bayesian mod-
els of cognition. First, as acknowledged by Frank and
Tenenbaum (2011), their models are not psychological
plausible. Second, in contrast to their claims, they can-
not be considered ideal-observer models either. Rather,
these models are implementations of specific hypotheses
about specific mechanisms of the mind; these mecha-
nisms, however, are largely speculative. Third, while
Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) models are based on the
assumption that human learners generally choose more
specific patterns over less specific ones, I show empiri-
cally that this hypothesis is not generally true. Frank
and Tenenbaum’s (2011) assumption, is, therefore, un-
founded. After these points, I will turn to the specific
experiments simulated by Frank and Tenenbaum (2011),
and assess whether their models provide an adequate
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account for the data.
Are Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) models psy-
chologically plausible?
Taking Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) model at face
value, they claim that, once infants enter an experimen-
tal room, they keep track of all syllables they have heard
in the experiment, and while comfortably seated on their
parent’s lap, contemplate all possible sequences that can
be formed with these syllables, as well as all possible
rules with which each of these hypothetical sequences
might or might not be consistent. As I will estimate
below, Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) model thus as-
sumes that infants can process up to 900 hypothetical
and counterfactual triplets per second. Such an account
of rule-learning appears implausible, and, to my knowl-
edge, is not supported by empirical evidence.
Are Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) models ideal
observer models?
Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) offer a defense against
the psychological implausibility of their models that is
often used by Bayesian modelers, and claim in Foot-
note 1 that “this approach to modeling learning is also
sometimes referred to as a ‘computational level’ analy-
sis, after Marr (1982), because it describes the compu-
tational structure of the task rather than the algorithms
or mechanisms necessary to perform it. Models at the
computational level [. . . ] compute normative statistical
inferences.” Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) further ar-
gue that the “models are ideal observer models: they
provide a description of the learning problem and show
what the correct inference would be, under a given set
of assumptions. [. . . ] On this approach, the ideal ob-
server becomes a baseline from which predictions about
human performance can be made. When performance
deviates from this baseline, researchers can make infer-
ences about how the assumptions of the model differ
from those made by human learners.”
After having reviewed their models, I will discuss
whether Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) adhered to these
goals. Specifically, I will ask (i) whether their mod-
els were used to make predictions as opposed to fit-
ting them to existing data, and (ii) whether the models
were used to detect non-normative behavior. Further,
I will provide several general reasons for which Frank
and Tenenbaum’s (2011) models cannot be considered
computational-level models, but rather make crucial im-
plementational assumptions.
More specific rules are not learned more easily
As mentioned above, the critical assumption of Frank
and Tenenbaum (2011) model is that humans choose
some rules over others because some rules are a pri-
ori more specific and harder to conform to. As I will
show below, this assumption underlies all of the models’
alleged successes. Hence, I will start by evaluating it
empirically.1
One prediction of this account is tested in the exper-
iments presented in Appendix A. Specifically, human
adults were familiarized with ABB triplets carried by
speech syllables. Hence, they could discover two rules.
The more “specific” rule stated that triplets followed an
ABB pattern; the less specific rule stated that triplets
were carried by human speech syllables. The rule that
all triplets follow an ABB is more specific than the rule
that triplets are carried by syllables, because the latter
rule is true of all possible triplets, while the former rule
is true only of a subset of the triplets
Following this familiarization, participants had to
choose between AAB triplets carried by other speech
syllables, and ABB items carried by rhesus monkey vo-
calizations. Hence, they had to choose between a triplet
conforming to the more specific rule (i.e., the repetition-
pattern) and violating the less specific rule (i.e., being
carried by speech syllables), and one triplet conforming
to the less specific rule and violating the more specific
rule.2 (I performed an analogous experiment where par-
ticipants were familiarized with AAB triplets.)
As shown in Appendix A, most participants found
that the triplets carried by speech syllables were more
like the familiarization items compared to the triplets
carried by rhesus vocalizations, even though the former
violated the repetition-pattern. A control experiment
showed that participants readily detected repetition-
patterns in rhesus vocalizations. This contradicts Frank
and Tenenbaum’s (2011) account, because, as men-
tioned above, a rule of the form “all items are syllables”
will inevitable receive lower probability scores than the
ABB pattern, and, as discussed below, a rule of this
kind is a critical component of Frank and Tenenbaum’s
(2011) model. Hence, the specificity of a rule does not
predict how easily it is learned.
1 In natural language acquisition, an acquisition strategy
assuming that infants learn the most restrictive grammar
consistent with what they hear (or with what they see in
the case of sign languages) is known as the subset princi-
ple (Hyams, 1986; Manzini & Wexler, 1987). However, in
contrast to Frank and Tenenbaum (2011), these authors did
not make unsupported assumptions about our rule-learning
abilities, but rather proposed that humans evolved to acquire
language following a sequence of acquisition steps that is con-
sistent with the subset principle, using specific “triggers” to
move from a more restrictive grammar to a more permissive
one.
2 The repetition-patterns remain more specific even if par-
ticipants anticipate that they will hear rhesus vocalizations,
and base their specificity computations on a corpus of all
items occurring during familiarization and test. If so, there
are 8 familiarization syllables, 2 test syllables, as well as 2
rhesus vocalizations, leading to a total of 123 = 1728 possible
triplets, of which 103 = 1000 contain only syllables, and of
which 12× (12−1) = 132 conform to the repetition-pattern.
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Of course, one can argue that the contrast be-
tween speech syllables and rhesus vocalizations is much
more salient than the contrast between the repetition-
patterns, and that the experiments reported in Ap-
pendix A are, therefore, an unfair test of Frank and
Tenenbaum’s (2011) model. While the contrast between
speech syllables and rhesus vocalizations is likely much
more salient, this is exactly the point: some rules are
much more salient than others, and this constrains how
humans (and other animals) learn rules. However, the
relative salience of the rules is by no means predicted by
the learning situation, nor by Frank and Tenenbaum’s
(2011) models.
Another potential criticism of these experiments is
that they do not rule out a role of specificity in rule-
learning, but rather show that other factors might be
more important. However, it is impossible to provide
evidence for the absence of a role of specificity, and
it is possible that learners might, in some situations,
prefer more specific patterns (or, for that matter, pat-
terns that happen to be more specific even if learners do
not consider specificity at all). At minimum, however,
these results fail to support the predictions of Frank
and Tenenbaum’s (2011) model and demonstrate that a
preference for more specific patterns cannot be taken for
granted. After all, given that all of Frank and Tenen-
baum’s (2011) alleged modeling successes critically de-
pend on the models’ ability to choose more specific rules,
one would expect actual humans to show at least some
sensitivity to this principle. Hence, it seems plausible
to conclude that there is no evidence from rule-learning
studies for a role of specificity in rule-learning, and the
experiments in Appendix A suggest that, if such a role
exists, it is not strong enough to drive rule-learning in
general.
Put differently, while a bias to choose more spe-
cific rules has sound computational justifications (e.g.,
Hyams, 1986; Manzini & Wexler, 1987; Tenenbaum &
Griffiths, 2001), there is no evidence at all that learners
follow this bias in artificial language learning studies. In
fact, one could offer the “explanation” of the rule learn-
ing results below that infants try to make the experi-
menters happy; after all, published studies are generally
consistent with the experimenters’ hypotheses, and hu-
mans have a tendency to be helpful (e.g., Warneken &
Tomasello, 2006). However, just as this “explanation”
fails to provide an account of how infants might pos-
sibly know what would make the experimenters happy,
and does not assess whether infants actually consider
experimenter happiness at all, Frank and Tenenbaum
(2011) do not explain how infants can possibly know
which patterns are more specific if they encounter the
patterns exclusively in laboratory studies, and do not
assess whether infants actually consider rule specificity
at all. Below, I will, therefore, assume that the role
of psychological theories is not psychologically agnostic
data-fitting. Hence, even when Frank and Tenenbaum’s
(2011) models fit the data, I will conclude that they fail
to provide an adequate account if the fit is exclusively
due to unsupported assumptions wired into the models.
A re-examination of the studies
modeled by Frank and
Tenenbaum (2011)
In this section, I will consider the experiments Frank
and Tenenbaum (2011) simulated, and ask whether they
provide an adequate account of these experiments.
Marcus et al. (1999)
Marcus et al. (1999) showed that seven-month old
infants can learn repetition-patterns such as AAB and
ABB. Given that Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) mod-
els have innate repetition-detectors, it is perhaps unsur-
prising that they can learn repetition-patterns.
However, a more detailed look at Frank and Tenen-
baum’s (2011) results raises the question of whether
their model really learned the repetition-patterns. In
fact, the model learned two rules. The repetition-
patterns, and a rule to which all triplets conform au-
tomatically (dubbed “(.,.,.)” by Frank & Tenenbaum,
2011). In the context of most of the experiments con-
sidered by Frank and Tenenbaum (2011), the rule “all
items are made of syllables”would be true of all triplets.
As acknowledged by Frank and Tenenbaum (2011),
the repetition-pattern is preferred exclusively due to the
assumption that learners prefer more specific rules that
are“harder”to conform to; without this assumption, the
model could not choose between the repetition-pattern,
and the rule to which all triplets conform automatically.
However, as mentioned above, this assumption is not
supported by the data from Appendix A.
Of course, the model preferred ABB to AAB triplets
when familiarized with ABB triplets, but this result is
unsurprising given that a repetition-detector, a sensitiv-
ity to positions in sequences and the possibility to com-
bine repetitions and positions, and, therefore, the very
possibility of discriminating between AAB and ABB
has been explicitly wired into the model. Crucially,
however, the assumption that allowed the model to re-
ject inappropriate grammars is not supported by human
behavior. As a result, the model fails to account for
Marcus et al.’s (1999) data.
Endress et al. (2007)
Endress et al. (2007) attempted to provide evidence
that repetitions are particularly salient patterns, and
that their saliency does not result from any obvious for-
mal or statistical factors. In their experiments, they
used piano tones to contrast two kinds of patterns. Some
participants had to learn the repetition-based patterns
ABB and ABA. Others learned what Endress et al.
(2007) called two “ordinal” patterns. The tones in these
triplets were ordered either as “lowest-highest-middle”
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(LHM), or as “middle-highest-lowest” (MHL; see Fig-
ure 1). Results showed that participants readily learned
the repetition-patterns; in contrast, they were much
worse on the ordinal pattern, and remained close to
chance performance even after hundreds of trials with
feedback.
Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) propose an alterna-
tive account of these findings. Regarding the learning
of repetition-patterns, Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011)
model preferentially learns the repetition-patterns over
the rule that is true of all items due to the assumption
that learners prefer more specific patterns to less specific
ones. As discussed above, this assumption is not sup-
ported by the experiments presented in Appendix A.
Regarding the participants’ difficulty with ordinal
patterns, the model had problems learning the ordinal
rules because multiple rules conformed to the triplets.
For example, LHM triplets conform to many different
rules, including: (i) the first tone is lower than the third
one, (ii) the first tone is lower than the second one, (iii)
the second tone is higher than the third one, (iv) the
first tone is lower than the second one and the third
one, and so on. The model thus has to “choose” the
most relevant of these patterns. According to Frank and
Tenenbaum (2011), participants have difficulties learn-
ing ordinal patterns because the model cannot decide
between the multiple rules that are consistent with the
triplets.
This account makes a prediction that is highly im-
plausible: people should be unable to discriminate pat-
terns consisting of rising vs. falling melodies. Specif-
ically, as shown in Figure 1, rearranging the tones in
LHM and MHL patterns leads to LMH and HML pat-
terns, that is, simply to rising and falling contours.
Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) predict that people should
have problems learning rising and falling contours, be-
cause these melodies are consistent with the same num-
ber of spurious rules as those melodies used by Endress
et al. (2007). Hence, the model would fail to learn ris-
ing vs. falling contours any better than Endress et al.’s
(2007) patterns.
Unsurprisingly, the experiment shown in Appendix B
demonstrates that people readily discriminate rising
from falling contours: after a familiarization with falling
triplets or rising triplets, most participants are at ceil-
ing discriminating rising from falling triplets, using the
same tones as Endress et al. (2007). In contrast to Frank
and Tenenbaum’s (2011) claims, the number of spurious
rules compatible with melodic patterns is, therefore, ir-
relevant to the success of actual humans in learning such
patterns. As a result, Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) fail
to provide an account of Endress et al.’s (2007) data.
Frank, Slemmer, et al. (2009)
Frank, Slemmer, et al. (2009) proposed that 5-
months-old infants are better at learning repetition-
patterns when these patterns are presented in two
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Endress et al., 2007 Experiment 3
Figure 1. In Endress et al.’s (2007) experiments, partic-
ipants had to learn the “ordinal” patterns low-high-middle
and middle-high-low. Rearranging the tones in the pattern
yields the patterns low-middle-high (rising) and high-middle-
low (falling). Frank & Tenenbaum’s (2011) model predicts
that it should be equally difficult to learn ordinal patterns as
to learn rising and falling patterns. Experiment 3 (presented
in Appendix B) demonstrates that this is not the case.
modalities simultaneously (i.e., looming shapes accom-
panied by syllables) compared to unimodal conditions
where triplets were composed of either shapes or sylla-
bles.
Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) provide two explana-
tions, both of which are problematic. The first expla-
nation relies on their assumption that learners prefer
more specific, harder-to-conform-to rules. That is, in-
fants might generate all 262,144 multimodal triplets,
and find that the triplets conforming to the repetition-
patterns are 64 times less numerous than the triplets
that conform to the rule that is automatically true of
every triplet. In the unimodal condition, in contrast, the
ratio between these triplet types is only 8 rather than
64. Hence, the specificity advantage is more pronounced
in the multimodal condition than in the unimodal con-
dition; according to Frank and Tenenbaum (2011), this
explains why infants are better at learning multimodal
rules.
While the experiments in Appendix A show that
actual learners do not necessarily prefer more spe-
cific, harder-to-conform-to rules, it is instructive to
BAYESIAN LEARNING AND RULE INDUCTION 7
take Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) explanation at face
value. If infants access all 262,144 triplets, and verify all
possible rules in a 5-min experiment, they have to check
about 900 triplets per second. It seems reasonable to
conclude that such a model requires further empirical
backing. Of course, Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) claim
that their model is an ideal observer model (but see
below), but even in this case, one might ask how the in-
fant mind might know that multi-modal rules are more
specific than uni-modal rules, and, if infants have innate
knowledge of the relative specificity of rules, why they
might have such knowledge in the first place.
Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) second explanation
of Frank, Slemmer, et al.’s (2009) data is based on the
assumption that infants might continuously consider the
possibility that they might have misperceived or misre-
membered a triplet or whatever they happen to perceive.
Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) assume that infants have a
certain probability of misremembering or misperceiving
triplets, and that they can adjust the probabilities of the
different patterns accordingly. According to Frank and
Tenenbaum (2011), infants believe that they are more
likely to misremember or misperceive unimodal stimuli
compared to multimodal stimuli. When infants misper-
ceive or misremember items, they randomly pick a rule
for these items. At first sight, Frank and Tenenbaum’s
(2011) second account just seems to be a description
of the experiments rather an explanation: by changing
the parameter controlling what the model considers its
misperception/misremembering probability, it becomes
easier to learn multimodal patterns compared to uni-
modal patterns.
However, this account raises an important problem.
If infants keep track of what they might (mis-) remem-
ber, then they are batch learners, and learn patterns by
faithfully remembering all of the triplets and then eval-
uating them. However, there is no evidence that infants
remember any of the triplets they have heard. More-
over, there is no need to remember any triplets either:
to learn the patterns, infants just need to remember the
patterns of the triplets, but not the triplets themselves.
In the complete absence of evidence for a batch learn-
ing model, it appears psychologically implausible, and
requires empirical evidence.
While Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) models can be
easily transformed into an online learner, their account
would raise the question of whether infants track mis-
perceptions at all, and mentally replace them with a ran-
domly picked rule. In fact, the most natural assumption
seems to be that infants simply ignore the subset of the
stimuli they do not remember. As a result, they would
perceive them less often if they are presented multiple
times. However, such a noise parameter would have only
a limited effect on learning performance in Frank and
Tenenbaum’s (2011) models. Hence, to fit their model to
the data, Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) posit that “mis-
remembered/misperceived” items are associated with a
randomly picked rule. Unfortunately, Frank and Tenen-
baum (2011) do not provide any evidence in favor of
this account. In any case, the model fails to account
for the learning of repetition-patterns in the first place,
because humans might not prefer more specific rules of
less specific ones.
Gerken (2006)
Gerken (2006) investigated the generality of the rules
that infants can learn. In one condition, infants were
familiarized with AAB or ABA triplets, roughly as in
Marcus et al.’s (1999) experiments. In the other condi-
tion, infants were again familiarized with AAB or ABA
triplets. Crucially, however, the B syllable was always
/di/, yielding patterns of the form AAdi and AdiA. In
both conditions, infants were then tested on triplets that
did not contain the syllable /di/.
When familiarized with AAB or ABB triplets, in-
fants discriminated consistent from inconsistent items;
in contrast, when familiarized with AAdi or AdiA items,
infants failed to discriminate between these items, al-
though the conditions did not differ significantly. How-
ever, when tested on novel AAdi or AdiA items, infants
discriminated inconsistent items from consistent ones.
In the two conditions where infants succeeded, Frank
and Tenenbaum’s (2011) model succeeds as well be-
cause the “winning” rule is more specific and harder-
to-conform-to than alternative rules (e.g., the rule that
is automatically true of all triplets). However, as men-
tioned above, Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) hypothesis
that more specific rules are learned preferentially is not
supported by the data presented in Appendix A.
While Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) model fails to
explain why repetition-rules can be learned in the first
instance, it also fails to explain why infants fail when
familiarized with AAdi or AdiA items and tested on
items that do not contain /di/. Specifically, Frank and
Tenenbaum (2011) assume that infants familiarized with
AAdi triplets maintain three distinct rules: (i) triplets
start with a repetition; (ii) triplets end with /di/; (iii)
triplets start with a repetition and end with /di/. That
is, while the third rule is the conjunction of the first two,
infants are claimed to maintain it separately. Given that
the last rule is the most specific one and the hardest to
conform to, the model prefers it.3 However, as men-
tioned above, the assumption that more specific rules
are generalized preferentially is not supported by the
experiments presented in Appendix A.
In fact, Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) explanation
of Gerken’s (2006) data does not only rely on the unsup-
ported assumption that more specific rules are learned
3 If there are N syllables used to construct the triplets, the
first rule generates N2 triplets: the first two syllables are a
repetition of any of the N syllables, while the last syllable
can again be any of the N syllables. The second rule yields
N
2 triplets for similar reasons. The third rule, in contrast,
yields only N triplets, and is, therefore, more specific than
the other two.
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preferentially, but also on further assumptions for which
there is no evidence. Specifically, Frank and Tenenbaum
(2011) assume that infants link rule (i) and rule (ii), and
combine them into a conjunction rule. However, there
is no evidence that infants actually link the two rules.
If they maintain both rules independently, neither rule
should be more specific. As a result, the model should
not prefer either rule, suggesting again that the models
fail to provide an account of Gerken’s (2006) data.
Gerken (2010)
Gerken (2010) asked whether very limited experi-
ence would allow infants to show evidence of learning
of the repetition-patterns when familiarized with AAdi
or AdiA triplets. As in Gerken’s (2006) experiments,
infants were familiarized with AAdi or AdiA triplets,
and then tested on AAB or ABA triplets that did not
contain /di/. Crucially, however, she added five addi-
tional familiarization triplets, three of which conformed
to the same repetition-pattern as the other familiariza-
tion triplets, but did not contain /di/. Strikingly, this
minimal change allowed infants to discriminate the two
repetition-patterns even if the test items did not con-
tain /di/. In a crucial control condition, Gerken (2006)
showed that replacing the AAdi or AdiA triplets with
music (and keeping the last 5 familiarization triplets) did
not allow infants to discriminate the repetition-patterns,
suggesting that infants did not just use the last five trials
to learn the repetition-pattern.
As in the simulations reviewed so far, Frank and
Tenenbaum’s (2011) model explains the learning success
by the model’s preference for more specific rules, which
is not supported by the data presented in Appendix A.
Further, Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) model makes
a prediction that has not been tested but that ap-
pears highly implausible. Specifically, Frank and Tenen-
baum’s (2011) equations (1) and (2) show that the
model predicts that, no matter for how long infants are
familiarized with AAdi or AdiA items, a single item
not containing /di/ leads to the rejection of all /di/
rules.4 For example, if human adults are familiarized
with 10,000 AAdi triplets, and then shown a single AAB
triplet not containing /di/, they should forget the AAdi
pattern, even if 9,999 out of 10,000 triplets were consis-
tent with it. This prediction appears implausible.
Importantly, this is not an unfair test of Frank and
Tenenbaum’s (2011) model. Given that Frank and
Tenenbaum (2011) consider a virtue of the model that
it can learn “with only a small amount of evidence” (p.
366), it seems reasonable to conclude that the flipside of
this ability, namely to unlearn“with only a small amount
of evidence,” is an equally crucial and central feature
of the model. Hence, the feature of Frank and Tenen-
baum’s (2011) model that allows them to fit Gerken’s
(2010) data makes incorrect predictions, suggesting that
it fails to provide an account of the data.
Marcus et al. (2007)
Marcus et al. (2007) asked whether infants preferen-
tially learn repetition-patterns in some stimulus modali-
ties than others. In a nutshell, they showed that infants
readily learn repetition-patterns when these are imple-
mented with speech syllables; however, they show no
significant learning when the triplets are implemented
using pure tones, timbres, or animal sounds during both
familiarization and test.
In a marked contrast, when infants are familiarized
with speech triplets conforming to a repetition-pattern,
they successfully discriminate the pattern they have
heard from unfamiliar patterns — even when tested on
tones, timbres or animal sounds. Marcus et al. (2007)
concluded that“infants may analyze speech more deeply
than other signals because it is highly familiar or highly
salient, because it is produced by humans, because it
is inherently capable of bearing meaning, or because
it bears some not-yet-identified acoustic property that
draws the attention of the rule-induction system” (p.
390).
Although this conclusion is plausible enough to be
taken as an accurate description of Marcus et al.’s (2007)
results, Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) took issue with it,
but failed to provide an adequate alternative account.
First, as in all other experiments reviewed so far, their
model fails to provide an account of why infants can
learn repetition-patterns in the first place, because the
model’s success relies on the assumption that infants
prefer the most specific, hardest-to-conform-to rule; as
mentioned above, this assumption is not supported by
the results reported in Appendix A.
Second, Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) explain Marcus
et al.’s (2007) data by speculating that infants mis-
perceive or misremember more non-speech items than
speech items, and that they randomly pick a rule for
the misperceived or misremembered items. Importantly,
however, Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) assume that
these perceptual problems are specific to the familiariza-
tion phase, while infants have perfect perception in the
test phase irrespective of the type of stimuli they are ex-
posed to.5 With this assumption, it is unsurprising that
4 The probability that a non-/di/ triplet has been gen-
erated by a rule involving /di/ is zero; as this probability
appears in the product used to calculate the probability of
the /di/ rules, the posterior probability of all /di/ rules is
necessarily zero as well.
5 From the middle part of their Figure 2, it is apparent
that Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) believe that it is reason-
able to assume that 80% of the non-speech items (and 10% of
the speech items) are misremembered or misperceived (but
only during familiarization, with perfect memory and per-
ception during test); the left part of their Figure 2 reveals
that, for the model to exhibit an advantage for speech items,
one needs to assume that infants misperceive at least 50 or
60% of the non-speech items.
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patterns implemented in speech are learned better than
patterns implemented with non-speech items; after all,
infants are hypothesized to misremember or misperceive
them.
However, there is no reason to assume that infants
perceive or remember the very same stimulus differently
depending on whether it appears in a familiarization
or a test phase. If one assumes that infants have the
same perceptual or memory difficulties during test as
during familiarization, they will perform much worse
when tested on non-speech material, even after a fa-
miliarization with speech items.
Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) acknowledge this prob-
lem, and mention in Footnote 9 that, if the same mem-
ory or perception problems are assumed during familiar-
ization and during test, they find “an appreciable gap in
performance between speech and [non-speech]”. How-
ever, this prediction is refuted by Marcus et al.’s (2007)
data: in their experiments, the discrimination between
consistent and inconsistent items yielded an effect size of
.886 in the speech condition, and of .745 in the condition
where infants were familiarized with speech items and
tested on tones. Using a unit-normal approximation to
the effect sizes, the two effect sizes are well within a
12% confidence interval of each other, and, therefore,
do not differ significantly. This, however, contradicts
Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) model.
In sum, Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) do not provide
an adequate account for Marcus et al.’s (2007) data,
both because their model cannot account for the learn-
ing of repetition-patterns in the first place, and because
their account of the differences between the speech and
non-speech conditions makes predictions that are incon-
sistent Marcus et al.’s (2007) data.
Saffran et al. (2007)
Saffran et al. (2007) showed that infants can learn
repetition-patterns of simultaneously presented dogs.
As with the other experiments reviewed so far, Frank
and Tenenbaum’s (2011) model fails to account for this
finding, because the assumption that learners prefer the
most specific rule is not supported by the data presented
in Appendix A.
Saffran et al. (2007) also showed that infants who
were (according to parental report) “very interested” in
dogs performed better than infants who were only “in-
terested.” Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) explain this
result by claiming that infants who are only “interested”
in dogs are more likely to misperceive or misremember
them; then, they randomly pick a rule for misremem-
bered or misperceived items, instead of simply ignoring
them. This leads to a negative correlation between the
probability that the model misremembered or misper-
ceived items and its rule-learning performance.
However, there are two reasons that make Frank and
Tenenbaum’s (2011) interpretation of the effects of inter-
est in dogs implausible. First, the left part of their Fig-
ure 2 shows that the biggest differences in rule-learning
performance arise when unreasonably large probabili-
ties of misremembering or misperceiving items are as-
sumed. (This can be seen by holding the value on the
x-axis constant, and varying what Frank and Tenen-
baum (2011) call the αNS parameter.) For example,
performance is essentially unchanged if the misremem-
bering/misperceiving probability is 0, 10, 20 or 30%, re-
spectively; in contrast there are large performance differ-
ences when large misremembering/misperceiving prob-
abilities of more than 40% are assumed. As a compari-
son, Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) assumed in the con-
text of Marcus et al.’s (2007) experiments that a mis-
remembering/misperception probability of 10% would
be reasonable. This is especially troublesome if Frank
and Tenenbaum’s (2011) model is located at the com-
putational level; after all, there is no difference in the
“computational structure” of Marcus et al.’s (2007) and
Saffran et al.’s (2007) experiments that justifies a four-
fold increase in the misremembering probability, sug-
gesting again that Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) do not
provide computational-level, ideal-observer models but
rather make detailed implementational assumptions.
Hence, Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) fail to provide
and adequate model of Saffran et al.’s (2007) data, both
because their model fails to learn repetition-patterns in
the first place, and because their explanation of the ef-
fects of infants’ interest in dogs relies on changing an
ad-hoc parameter that they know a priori to correlate
with rule-learning performance.
Go´mez (2002)
Go´mez (2002) investigated the role of variability for
learning dependencies between non-adjacent items, both
in adults and in infants. In the experiments with adults
(those modeled by Frank & Tenenbaum, 2011), partic-
ipants listened to triplets of the form aXd, bXe and
cXf. a,b, c, d, e and f were specific non-words; X came
from classes with 2, 6, 12 or 24 members. The size of
the classes was varied across participants. Importantly,
Go´mez (2002) equated the number of occurrences of the
a . . . f words in the different class-size conditions. That
is, each triplet was presented 72, 24, 12 and 6 times
for the class-sizes 2, 6, 12 and 24, respectively. Fol-
lowing this familiarization, participants were presented
with test items, and had to choose whether they had
heard them. These items were either items they had
actually heard, or foils where the regularity between the
first and the last word in a triplet was broken (i.e., foils
had the form aXe, bXf or cXd). When the X words came
from classes of 2, 6, or 12 elements, participants discrim-
inated correct triplets from foils only at low, marginally
significant levels of performance. In contrast, when X
was taken from a set of 24 elements, performance was
excellent.
To account for these data, Frank and Tenenbaum
(2011) first modified their model to enable it to learn
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multiple rules simultaneously; that is, they modified it
so that it could learn all three dependencies between ini-
tial and final words. Second, they postulated that par-
ticipants misremember or misperceive exactly 60% of the
triplets they heard. (As shown in their Figure 3, if the
model misremembers or misperceives fewer triplets, the
performance of smaller set sizes becomes too high; and
when it misremembers or misperceives more triplets, the
overall performance becomes too low.)
This account is problematic for three important rea-
sons. First, as in all other simulations reviewed so
far, the model selects the appropriate rules by choosing
the most specific ones compatible with the input; Ap-
pendix A shows that this assumptions is unsupported.
Second, to fit the model to the data, Frank and Tenen-
baum (2011) have to set a parameter to a specific value
although it is unclear why, according to Frank and
Tenenbaum (2011), “the computational structure”of the
problem dictates a forgetting rate of exactly 60%.
Third, and crucially, granting that Frank and Tenen-
baum’s (2011) misremembering parameter has psycho-
logical meaning, their assumption that it is constant for
the different class-size conditions is most likely incorrect.
As mentioned above, Go´mez (2002) kept the number of
tokens in each class-size condition constant; for exam-
ple, each triplet was played 72 times when X items were
taken from a set of two words, and 6 times X items
were taken from a set of 24 words. Hence, one would
expect the misremembering likelihood to be higher when
X items are taken from a set of 24 words than when they
are taken from a set of two words.
In Figure 2, I replotted the results from Frank and
Tenenbaum’s (2011) Figure 3, but taking into account
that triplets are repeated more often in the low vari-
ability condition than in the high variability conditions.
Specifically, I assumed that the misremembering proba-
bility is lowest in the low variability condition, and that
it decreases proportionally to the logarithm of the num-
ber of repetitions of each triplet. As shown in Figure
1, the results directly contradict Go´mez’s (2002) data:
while participants performed best for the high variability
condition, the model performed best for the low variabil-
ity condition.
There is also a second way of using the misremem-
bering/misperception parameter in the context Go´mez’s
(2002) data. After all, she asked how likely partici-
pants were to endorse items they had heard, and items
they had not heard and violated the non-adjacent de-
pendency. Hence, Go´mez’s (2002) experiments might
be seen, at least in principle, as testing the memory
of the items participants had heard, even though it is
clear that participants’ performance was not driven by
memory for complete triplets. (After all, their perfor-
mance was worse for triplets they had heard 72 times
than for triplets they had heard 6 times.) For the sake
of completeness, I plotted in Figure 2 the model pre-
dictions assuming that participants’ actual performance
was reflected in the misremembering/misperception pa-
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Figure 2. Results of Go´mez’s (2002) data (solid line with
circles), and two predictions of Frank & Tenenbaum’s (2011)
model. (Dashed line with triangles) In Go´mez’s (2002) ex-
periments, triplets with 2, 6, 12 and 24 X items were re-
peated 72, 24, 12 and 6 times, respectively. Assuming that
the number of repetitions increases the memory strength
of items (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1913), Frank & Tenenbaum’s
(2011) misremembering parameter should decrease with the
number of repetitions. Choosing the smallest misremem-
bering parameter in Frank & Tenenbaum’s (2011) Figure 3
as the misremembering probability for 72 repetitions, and
then scaling the misremembering parameter proportionally
to the logarithm of the number of repetitions yields misre-
membering probabilities of 10, 30, 50 and 60% corresponding
to 72, 24, 12 and 6 repetitions, respectively. Under these
assumptions, Frank & Tenenbaum’s (2011) model predicts
that participants should be best with two X items, while
participants actually are best with 24 it X items. (Dotted
line with crosses) A different way of interpreting Frank &
Tenenbaum’s (2011) misremembering parameter is to con-
sider Go´mez’s (2002) experiments as memory experiments
(although they clearly are not), and to consider the percent-
age of incorrect responses in each of the condition as Frank &
Tenenbaum’s (2011) misremembering parameter. Choosing
the misremembering probabilities in Frank & Tenenbaum’s
(2011) Figure 3 that are closest to the percentages of incor-
rect responses in Go´mez’s (2002) experiment shows that the
model predicts participants to be at ceiling from set-size 12
onwards. This result replicates that the misremembering pa-
rameter correlates with performance. Importantly, however,
the pattern of results does not fit the behavior of Go´mez’s
(2002) participants.
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rameter; that is, for each set size, I used the misremem-
bering/misperception probability that was closest to the
participants’ probability of incorrect responses.
It should be noted that using the misremember-
ing/misperception parameter in this way is circular;
given that Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) report in the
context of Saffran et al. (2007) data that the misre-
membering/misperception probability is negatively cor-
related with performance, one would expect this to be
case here as well. Hence, the model should perform
better for larger class-sizes for this reason alone. Impor-
tantly, however, the model’s results did not fit those of
Go´mez’s (2002) participants, as it performed at ceiling
for all class-sizes from 12 onwards.
In sum, Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) model fails
to account for Go´mez’s (2002) data, both because it
makes assumptions unsupported by the results reported
in Appendix A, and because the model’s results clash
with those of actual participants.
Kova´cs and Mehler (2009a)
Kova´cs and Mehler (2009a) investigated how easy it
is for infants to learn two patterns simultaneously. In
their experiments, two patterns (e.g., AAB and ABA)
predicted visual rewards on two different locations on
a screen; they measured whether, upon hearing a pat-
tern, infants would show anticipatory looks to the lo-
cation where the reward would appear. They showed
that infants from bilingual households learned both
rules, but monolinguals learned only one. Kova´cs and
Mehler (2009a) proposed that the bilingual advantage
was due to bilinguals’ well known advantage in execu-
tive function (e.g., Bialystok & Craik, 2010), which they
had shown to be present already in infancy (Kova´cs &
Mehler, 2009b).
Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) explanation of Kova´cs
and Mehler’s (2009a) results is to introduce an addi-
tional parameter controlling how likely the model is to
postulate multiple rules, and to show that the model is
more likely to posit multiple rules when the parameter
is set to allow for multiple rules. They conclude that
bilingual infants have “a more permissive prior on the
number of regularities infants assume to be present in a
particular stimulus. In practice this may be manifest via
better executive control, as hypothesized by Kova´cs &
Mehler.” In other words, Frank and Tenenbaum (2011)
found that a model that is designed to be more likely
to admit more than one regularity is indeed more likely
to learn more than one regularity, and conclude that
bilinguals are somehow designed to be more likely to
admit more than one regularity as well.
However, Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) simulations
fail to provide an account of Kova´cs and Mehler’s
(2009a) data. First, as in all other simulations reviewed
so far, the model fails to provide an account of the
learning of repetition-patterns because the underlying
assumption is not supported by the data reported in
Appendix A: human learners do not necessarily prefer
more specific, harder-to-conform-to rules.
Second, even though Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011)
extra-parameter allowed them to fit their model to the
data, their conclusion completely ignores the substan-
tial literature on the effects of bilingualism on executive
function. It is well established that bilingual adults and
children have better executive function in a variety of
tasks that are entirely unrelated to learning multiple reg-
ularities. These tasks include dimensional card sorting
tasks (e.g., Bialystok, 1999; Bialystok & Martin, 2004),
the Simon task (e.g., Bialystok et al., 2004), the Stroop
task (e.g., Bialystok et al., 2008), and the Flanker task
(Costa et al., 2008). In the case of reversal learning,
the executive advantage can be observed even in early
infancy (Kova´cs & Mehler, 2009b). Further, the effects
of the bilingual advantage are seen in domains such as
Theory of Mind (Kova´cs, 2009) that have no obvious
relation to regularity learning either.
It thus seems reasonable to conclude that Frank and
Tenenbaum’s (2011) additional parameter has no rela-
tion at all to the data presented by Kova´cs and Mehler
(2009a), on top of the fact that their model does not ac-
count for the learning of repetition-patterns in the first
instance.
Did Frank and Tenenbaum
(2011) use their models as ideal
observer models after all?
As discussed in the introduction, the goal of Frank
and Tenenbaum’s (2011)“ideal observer”models, as well
as of many other Bayesian models of cognition, is (i) to
make predictions, and to (ii) detect non-normative be-
havior. Both would be important contributions to our
knowledge. As a result, it is crucial to assess to what
extent their models achieved these goals.
Regarding the first goal, the review of Frank and
Tenenbaum’s (2011) models suggests that they fitted
their models to existing data, but did not make any
novel predictions. Even in cases where their models
make novel predictions, Frank and Tenenbaum (2011)
do not discuss them. For example, they do not discuss
why their model predicts that humans should be unable
to discriminate rising from falling melodies; nor do they
discuss why their account of Gerken’s (2010) data pre-
dicts that learning should suffer catastrophically from a
single counter-example, irrespective of how much expo-
sure is given. They do not evaluate the models’ predic-
tions for Go´mez’s (2002) data either.
Regarding the second goal, Frank and Tenenbaum
(2011) did not appear to attempt to detect non-
normative behavior, but simply made additional as-
sumptions to fit their models to the data. For example,
they note that their first model cannot account for the
learning differences as a function of the infants’ interest
in the stimuli (Saffran et al., 2007), and add additional
assumptions to the model as a result. A natural as-
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sumption would be that infants are simply more likely to
ignore the stimuli they are not interested in, leading in-
fants to perceive each training item less often. However,
such an assumption would not allow Frank and Tenen-
baum’s (2011) model to fit the learning differences. As
a result, they opt for a different assumption that does
allow them to fit the data, namely that infants attribute
a randomly chosen pattern to some randomly chosen
familiarization items that they do not even remember.
(Similar accounts are offered for Frank, Slemmer, et al.’s
(2009) and Marcus et al.’s (2007) data.) Despite its
prima facie implausibility, no further predictions of this
account are offered.
Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) focus on data fitting
rather than on detecting non-normative behavior is also
evident in their account of Marcus et al.’s (2007) exper-
iments. To fit their models to the data, they assume
that infant perception has markedly different properties
depending on whether infants hear familiarization items
or test items, even if nothing distinguishes the two types
of items. It is hard to see how such an account would
follow from the computational structure of the learning
problem, or how it could be justified otherwise.
Likewise, to account for the ability of bilingual but
not monolingual infants to learn several rules simulta-
neously, Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) postulate that
bilinguals are more likely to posit multiple rules in gen-
eral, completely ignoring Kova´cs and Mehler’s (2009a)
natural explanation based on the well-established exec-
utive function advantage in bilinguals. Rather, Frank
and Tenenbaum (2011) opinionate that the bilinguals’
increased propensity to postulate multiple rules “may
be manifest via better executive control [in practice].”
However, they fail to provide an account why the
propensity to learn multiple rules might be important
for, say, the Stroop task, nor do they make any predic-
tions from this account. It seems plausible to conclude
that a model that wires in the data it attempts to re-
produce is not well suited for detecting non-normative
behavior.
That being said, Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) did
modify their model in response to data that the simpler
versions of the model could not fit; however, according to
Frank and Tenenbaum (2011), all versions of their model
count as ideal-observer models, raising the question of
what, if any, data would constitute evidence against the
ideal observer view of rule-learning, or whether a model
with an arbitrary number of assumptions is still“a useful
baseline for future work on rule learning.”
In addition to not using their models to make predic-
tions or to detect non-normative behavior, Frank and
Tenenbaum’s (2011) highly detailed implementational
assumptions suggest that their models cannot be consid-
ered ideal observer models. For example, they assume
that learners come innately equipped with a repetition-
detector, a detector for rising tone intervals, one for
falling tone intervals, a mechanism that can link specific
syllables to positions in triplets, and a mechanism that
can combine all of these rules into one.
These implementational assumptions have a profound
impact on the model predictions. For example, without
a repetition-detector, the models could not learn the
repetition-patterns. However, while Frank and Tenen-
baum (2011) claim that their model describes the “com-
putational structure” of the learning problem, the com-
putational structure does not imply that the ability
to notice repeated items is implemented using a dedi-
cated repetition-detector. In fact, it is possible to know
that the sequence “pupu” contains two identical sylla-
bles by noticing that the number of syllable tokens does
not match the number of syllable types. Likewise, to
know that two tones are identical, we can notice that
the first tone is neither higher nor lower than the sec-
ond one. Importantly, these are not just ad-hoc argu-
ments against Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) model,
but, on both computational and psychological grounds,
there is no a priori reason to take a repetition-detector
for granted.6 Hence, the “computational structure” of
rule-learning implies by no means the existence of a
repetition-pattern. But without this assumption, Frank
and Tenenbaum’s (2011) results would be profoundly
changed.7 (While both the account sketched below
and Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) models share the
assumption of a repetition-detector, Frank and Tenen-
baum (2011) reject the evidence for such a mechanism
(see the review of their simulations of Endress et al.’s
(2007) data above). Hence, by Frank and Tenenbaum’s
(2011) own conclusions, the assumption that humans
are endowed with a repetition-detector would be entirely
unsubstantiated.)
6 From a computational point of view, there are computer
architectures without equality operators but only “greater
than” and “smaller than” operators. (On such architectures,
an instruction to check the equality of two numbers is in-
ternally translated to checking that one number is neither
greater nor smaller than the other.) Such architectures
would not have a repetition-detector. From a psychological
perspective, domains without repetition-detectors are well
documented as well. For example, it is much easier to notice
that two lines of contour are symmetrical than that they are
repeated (i.e., that the two lines are translations of one an-
other; Baylis & Driver, 1994, 1995, 2001); it is much harder
or even impossible to process repetitions on consonants than
on vowels (Pons & Toro, 2010; Toro, Bonatti, Nespor, &
Mehler, 2008; Toro, Shukla, Nespor, & Endress, 2008); and
human adults are unable to learn repetition-patterns over
syntactic categories (Endress & Hauser, 2009).
7 If repetitions are detected as a combination of two rules,
for example as the negated conjunction of two“difference de-
tectors,” they necessarily become less accessible, because the
probabilities of the two component rules must be multiplied
at some point, resulting in a lower overall probability. Of
course, it is possible to “patch” such a model, but this would
be just another implementational assumption that is wired
into the model.
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Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) do not only make
strong implementational assumptions about the avail-
able psychological mechanisms, but even about their de-
tailed inner workings. For example, to fit their models to
the various experiments, Frank and Tenenbaum (2011)
sometimes assume that the forgetting rate is 10%, for
other experiments 40%, and for still other experiments
80% — even though the computational problem is ex-
actly the same. It is hard to see how such assumptions
can be justified by the computational structure of the
learning problem.8
It thus appears that, rather than making predictions
or attempting to detect non-normative behaviors, Frank
and Tenenbaum (2011) just attempted to fit their mod-
els to available data, using additional assumptions with
no clear justification or further predictions. Hence,
it seems plausible to conclude that Frank and Tenen-
baum’s (2011) models do not address any of the goals
they attribute to ideal observer models.
Put differently, one might ask what the role of
the Bayesian computations are for the models’ suc-
cesses. In fact, what Frank and Tenenbaum (2011)
propose is a model positing that, among other things,
(i) more specific rules are learned more readily; (ii) in-
fants know, presumably innately, which patterns are
more specific, even if they encounter the patterns exclu-
sively during experiments; (iii) the same items are per-
ceived/remembered differently depending on whether
they appear during familiarization or during test; (iv)
forgetting rates can be arbitrarily set, sometimes to
10%, sometimes to 60%, and sometimes to 80%; (v)
there is catastrophic forgetting due to single counter-
examples. Had these assumptions not been swept under
the Bayesian carpet, it is hard to see how they could
follow from the computational structure of the learning
problem.
An account based on
common-sense psychology
While Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) models do not
appear to provide an adequate account of any of the ex-
periments reviewed above, a model based on perceptual
or memory primitives might fare much better. I will now
discuss these basic psychological explanations of each of
the experiments reviewed above.
Marcus et al. (1999), Endress et al. (2007)
The view that humans are equipped with a repetition-
detector that makes repetitions relatively salient pat-
terns provides a straightforward interpretation of
Marcus et al.’s (1999) and Endress et al.’s (2007) data,
because these experiments show that humans can learn
repetition-patterns, and that such patterns are learned
better than arbitrary patterns for which no such detec-
tor exists.
Frank, Slemmer, et al. (2009)
As before, the ability to learn repetition-patterns can
be explained by the existence of a repetition-detector.
Likewise, there are numerous straightforward explana-
tions of Frank, Slemmer, et al.’s (2009) finding that
multi-modal rules are learned better than uni-modal
rules. One possible interpretation is that infants re-
ceived more instances of the repetition-pattern. That is,
in the multimodal condition, infants were presented with
visual and auditory triplets simultaneously and, there-
fore, with twice as many triplets as in either unimodal
conditions. A second possible interpretation relates to
variability of the stimuli. In the multimodal condition,
triplets were more variable, as infants perceived both
visual and auditory triplets; if variability helps learning
(Go´mez, 2002), infants might learn better in the multi-
modal condition as well. A third possible interpretation
is provided by the fact that infants have more opportu-
nities to attend to the stimuli in the multimodal con-
dition; for example, if they are distracted by a sound,
they might still attend to the visual stimuli, and if they
are distracted by other visual objects, they might still
attend to the sounds. A fourth account relies on the fact
that infants have more opportunities to recognize the fa-
miliar pattern during test: if they do not attend to the
sound of a test item, they might still attend to its visual
component, and vice versa. It is easy to come up with
further explanations of Frank, Slemmer, et al.’s (2009)
data relying on basic psychological considerations.
Gerken (2006), Gerken (2010)
Gerken’s (2006) and Gerken’s (2010) experiments can
be explained if, in addition to being sensitive to repe-
titions, humans (and other animals) track items in the
edges of sequences (e.g., Endress & Mehler, 2009; En-
dress, Carden, Versace, & Hauser, 2010; Seidl & John-
son, 2006), and if they expect test items to conform to
all regularities they have heard. That is, infants might
consider triplets as a violation if any of the rules is
violated. For example, when familiarized with AAB
triplets (where the last syllable is not systematically
/di/), infants should be sensitive to violations of the
8 It might be argued that there is a long-standing dis-
tinction between the assumptions of a model and its free
parameters in machine learning, and that reliance of Frank
and Tenenbaum’s (2011) model on specific parameter values
should not be considered an assumption. However, the goals
of machine learning and cognitive science are rather different.
In fact, from a cognitive point of view, the purpose of a mod-
eling enterprise is not merely to obtain model fits that are
agnostic about psychological considerations; rather, param-
eters such as memory retention rates have specific psycho-
logical meaning, and should be treated as such. Moreover,
and as mentioned above, it is unclear whether a model that
relies on specific parameter values should be considered an
ideal observer model.
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repetition-pattern, because this is the only regularity
present in the data. In contrast, when familiarized with
AAdi triplets, both AAB and ABB triplets are viola-
tions, since they do not conform to the /di/ regular-
ity. Hence, infants might “expect” triplets to be consis-
tent with all of the patterns they have picked up. If so,
the role of the five additional familiarization triplets in
Gerken’s (2010) studies might be to familiarize infants
with items not containing /di/, which, in turn, would
allow them to reveal their learning of the repetition-
pattern in the subsequent test phase, without being“sur-
prised” to hear triplets not containing /di/.
Alternatively, items in edge positions might be more
salient than repetitions (Gervain & Endress, in prepara-
tion), and, therefore, more likely to drive behavior com-
pared to repetition-patterns. Note that rule saliency
is not a placeholder to make the perceptual or mem-
ory primitives view consistent with the data. Rather,
the more salient rule is empirically defined as the rule
which participants choose when both rules are pitted
against each other. (Such an empirically defined concept
of saliency is well accepted among Bayesian modelers as
well; see e.g. Frank & Goodman, 2012). If so, the role
of the five additional familiarization triplets in Gerken’s
(2010) experiments would be to familiarize infants with
violations of the more salient pattern, allowing them to
reveal their sensitivity to the less salient one.
Marcus et al. (2007), Saffran et al. (2007)
Marcus et al.’s (2007) experiments can be explained
with Marcus et al.’s (2007) account: humans pref-
erentially attend to speech as opposed to non-speech
items (e.g., Pen˜a et al., 2003; Vouloumanos & Werker,
2004); as speech items are also sounds, the learning of
repetition-patterns over speech-items might spill over
to allow the recognition of repetition-patterns in other
sounds. Likewise, Saffran et al.’s (2007) results follow
from the truism that infants attend more to what they
are interested in.
Go´mez (2002), Kova´cs and Mehler (2009a),
Dawson and Gerken (2009)
Like Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) models, the per-
ceptual or memory primitives account does not provide
a good explanation of Go´mez’s (2002) data; nor does it
provide any insight into why infants’ ability to process
repetition-patterns over musical stimuli changes over de-
velopment (Dawson & Gerken, 2009). Likewise, I simply
refer to Kova´cs and Mehler’s (2009b) suggestion that
bilingual infants might learn multiple rules due to their
enhanced executive function.
In sum, it seems that most of the data simulated by
Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) can be explained based on
simple psychological mechanisms. However, like Frank
and Tenenbaum’s (2011) models, this account fails to
provide an explanation of Go´mez’s (2002) and Kova´cs
and Mehler’s (2009b) data; unlike Frank and Tenen-
baum’s (2011) models, however, it is much harder to
“patch” this account with further assumptions to fit it
to the data, making it more verifiable and, therefore,
more useful for discovering the nature of human rule-
extracting capacities.
Conclusions
In 2002, Daniel Kahneman was awarded the Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for showing that
human behavior is not rational as assumed in most mod-
els of economic choice. Kahneman’s work triggered the
creation of behavioral economics, studying how actual
humans make choices. Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011)
paper is an example of a growing trend moving into the
opposite direction, and arguing that humans are rational
learners after all, making“optimal,”Bayesian, decisions.
While several authors have criticized such models on
theoretical grounds (Altmann, 2010; Bowers & Davis,
2012; Fitelson, 1999; Jones & Love, 2011; Marcus, 2008,
2010; Sakamoto et al., 2008), the assumptions of these
models are rarely spelled out in plain English, which
makes it hard to evaluate and test their psychological
predictions. Here, I present a case study of a model in
a domain that is arguably well-suited to Bayesian ap-
proaches, spell out its assumptions and predictions, and
confront them with empirical data.
Frank and Tenenbaum (2011) attempt to account
for various experimental results in the domain of rule-
learning. According to Frank and Tenenbaum (2011),
their models are psychologically implausible, but consti-
tute computational-level, ideal-observer models of such
results. However, while the analyses of the models con-
firmed that the underlying assumptions are psychologi-
cally implausible indeed, closer examination of the mod-
els revealed several reasons for which the models are dif-
ficult to accept as ideal-observer models. First, Frank
and Tenenbaum (2011) fall short of their own modeling
goals; neither do they make novel predictions nor do
they detect any non-normative behavior. Second, there
is no more support for the assumption underlying Frank
and Tenenbaum’s (2011) models — that humans learn
the most specific, hardest-to-conform-to rule — than for
an arbitrary “theory”, such as that infants try to make
experimenters happy. Third, Frank and Tenenbaum
(2011) make a large number of crucial implementational
assumptions that sometimes go as far as claiming that
the infant perceptual system has different properties for
the same stimuli, depending on whether they are pre-
sented during a familiarization or a test phase.
Accordingly, Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) models
do not provide an account of any of the results they
attempted to model, unless the goal of psychological
theory is to obtain psychology-agnostic data fits. The
problematic model predictions are summarized in Ta-
ble 1. The models’ ability to learn any rule at all re-
lies on the empirically unsupported assumption that hu-
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mans preferentially learn the most specific, hardest-to-
conform-to rules. Leaving aside this problem, their ex-
planation of Endress et al.’s (2007) experiments predicts
that humans cannot discriminate rising from falling con-
tours (see Appendix B); their account of Marcus et al.’s
(2007) data predicts that the infant perceptual system
has different properties for the same stimuli, depend-
ing on whether they are presented during a familiariza-
tion or a test phase; and, when Frank and Tenenbaum’s
(2011) model parameters are taken seriously, their sim-
ulation results do not even reproduce the basic pattern
of Go´mez’s (2002) results. Of course, it is possible to
“patch” Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) models to ac-
count for each of the experiments reviewed above. How-
ever, a model where the underlying representational as-
sumptions need to be changed for every data point fails
to generate scientific insight.
It should be noted that these problems are not spe-
cific to Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) models. In fact,
there are very few models that adhere to the model-
ing goals stated by Frank and Tenenbaum (2011). For
example, Bayesian models of cognitive phenomena are
usually not constructed to make predictions, but rather
to fit existing data, giving modelers the opportunity to
adapt their models to the experiments they attempt to
fit (but see e.g. Orba´n et al., 2008 for an exception).
Moreover, these models typically have straightforward
alternative explanations in terms of basic psychological
mechanisms.
Further, Bayesian models of cognition are generally
not used to detect non-normative behavior; in fact,
except in the decision making literature and, in some
cases, in the reasoning literature (e.g., Bes et al., 2012;
Fernbach & Sloman, 2009), it is extremely rare that
a Bayesian model of a cognitive phenomenon is pub-
lished because the model does not account for the phe-
nomenon. Moreover, even if a Bayesian model did not
account for a cognitive phenomenon, it would be un-
clear whether this was due to unfounded assumptions
(e.g., that learners prefer the most specific rules), or
rather to genuine suboptimality. It would thus seem
that Bayesian models of cognitive phenomena are rarely
used as ideal observer models, and often share implau-
sible assumptions similar to Frank and Tenenbaum’s
(2011) .
In contrast, and as discussed above, there is a sat-
isfactory alternative account of the experiments based
on simple psychological principles. This account is
more piecemeal and less systematic than Frank and
Tenenbaum’s (2011), but appears to explain the data.
For example, humans might learn some rules using
a repetition-detector (Endress et al., 2007; Go´mez,
Gerken, & Schvaneveldt, 2000; Tunney & Altmann,
2001) or by attending to elements in sequence-edges
(Endress & Mehler, 2009), and these mechanisms might
constrain each other (Endress et al., 2005) and be con-
strained by various other factors, including phonologi-
cal information (Pons & Toro, 2010; Toro, Bonatti, et
al., 2008; Toro, Shukla, et al., 2008), syntactic processes
(Endress & Hauser, 2009), executive function (Kova´cs &
Mehler, 2009b), and probably many other aspects of our
mental life. Such a collection of processes might not be
elegant, and elude understanding based on higher-order
principles. However, it might well reflect the true nature
of our mental machinery. In fact, various authors have
characterized cognition as an agglomeration of heuris-
tics (Gigerenzer, Todd, & The ABC Group, 1999), as
a “bag of tricks” (Ramachandran, 1990), as a kludge
(Marcus, 2008) or as using a collection of primitive op-
erations (Endress et al., 2009), each of which evolved to
solve a particular problem in an organism’s environment
(Cheney & Seyfarth, 2007; Gallistel, 1990, 2000; Hauser,
2000). Before attempting to construct computational-
level theories of cognitive operations, we thus first need
to understand what is computed, and how.
Appendix A
Experiments 1 and 2: Do
humans prefer the most specific
rule compatible with the input?
In Experiment 1, I ask whether actual human learn-
ers conform to the central assumption that allows Frank
and Tenenbaum’s (2011) model to learn any rule at all,
namely that learners prefer more specific, harder-to-
conform-to rules over less specific ones (see main text
for more details). To test this hypothesis, I familiar-
ized human adults with either an AAB pattern or an
ABB pattern, both carried by speech syllables. Follow-
ing this, participants who had been familiarized with an
AAB pattern had to choose between triplets of rhesus
monkey vocalizations following an AAB pattern, and
triplets of new human syllables following an ABB pat-
tern; likewise, participants familiarized with an ABB
pattern had to choose between triplets of rhesus mon-
key vocalizations following anABB pattern, and triplets
of new human syllables following an AAB pattern. In
other words, participants had to choose between the
repetition-pattern they had been familiarized with, and
the rule that all items are carried by speech syllables.
The repetition-pattern is clearly more specific than
the rule that all items are carried by syllables; after all,
the latter is true of all possible syllable triplets, while the
former is true only of a subset of them. The repetition-
patterns remain more specific when considering the vo-
cabulary of all familiarization and test items. Specifi-
cally, there are 8 familiarization syllables, 2 test sylla-
bles, as well as 2 rhesus vocalizations, leading to a total
of 123 = 1728 possible triplets, of which 103 = 1000
contain only syllables, and of which 12× (12− 1) = 132
conform to the repetition-pattern.
Experiment 2 is a control experiment to Experi-
ment 1, showing that, as in Marcus et al.’s (2007) ex-
periments, human learners can discriminate repetition-
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Table 1
Experiments Frank & Tenenbaum (2011) allegedly reproduced, reasons for the models’ success, predictions inconsis-
tent with available data, as well as alternative explanations based on simple psychological principles.
Experiment Reason for modeling success Deviations from predictions Alternative interpretation
Marcus et al. (1999)
Repetition-patterns are more
specific than control patterns.
Humans do not choose more spe-
cific patterns; see Appendix A.
Humans are equipped with a rep-
etition detector that makes repe-
titions salient.
Endress et al. (2007)
• Repetition-patterns are
learned as in the Marcus et al.
(1999) case.
• Ordinal patterns are difficult
because they are consistent with
various rules.
• Humans do not choose more
specific patterns; see Appendix
A.
• Humans can discriminate ris-
ing from falling melodies; see Ap-
pendix B.
Humans are equipped with a rep-
etition detector that makes repe-
titions salient.
Frank, Slemmer, et al. (2009)
• Repetition-patterns are
learned as in the Marcus et al.
(1999) case.
• Multi-modal rules are more
“specific.”
• Multi-modal rules are per-
ceived better.
Humans do not choose more spe-
cific patterns; see Appendix A.
• Multi-modal stimuli are more
variable.
• Multi-modal stimuli provide
more opportunities to learn.
• Multi-modal stimuli provide
more opportunities for success
during test.
• . . .
Gerken (2006)
• Repetition-patterns are
learned as in the Marcus et al.
(1999) case.
• Infants maintain a conjunction
rule of two rules.
• The “winning” conjunction
rule is more “specific.”
• If the unsupported assumption
that infants maintain conjunc-
tion rules is not valid, no rule
would be more specific.
• Humans do not choose more
specific patterns; see Appendix
A.
• Some rules are easier to learn
than others.
• People expect items to con-
form to all rules that have been
learned.
Gerken (2010)
• Repetition-patterns are
learned as in the Marcus et al.
(1999) case.
• Infants maintain a conjunction
rule of two rules.
• Humans do not choose more
specific patterns; see Appendix
A.
• Humans should unlearn rules
based on a single counterexam-
ple after thousands of positive
examples.
• Some rules are easier to learn
than others.
• People expect items to con-
form to all rules that have been
learned.
Marcus et al. (2007)
• Repetition-patterns are
learned as in the Marcus et al.
(1999) case.
• Non-speech items have a mis-
perception probability of 80%
during familiarization, and 0%
during test.
• Humans do not choose more
specific patterns; see Appendix
A.
• Perception does not have dif-
ferent properties for familiariza-
tion items and test items.
• There are other performance
differences that are not observed
empirically.
Humans preferentially process
speech; see Marcus et al. (2007).
Saffran et al. (2007)
• Repetition-patterns are
learned as in the Marcus et al.
(1999) case.
• Infants are more than four
times more likely to misremem-
ber/misperceive items than in
Marcus et al.’s (2007) experi-
ments.
• Humans do not choose more
specific patterns; see Appendix
A.
• See main text.
Infants who are more interested
in stimuli attend more to these
stimuli.
Go´mez (2002)
• The “winning” rule is more
“specific.”
• Participants misremember ex-
actly 60% of the items.
• Humans do not choose more
specific patterns.
• The predicted results deviate
qualitatively from the empirical
data.
?
Kova´cs & Mehler (2009b)
• Repetition-patterns are
learned as in the Marcus et al.
(1999) case.
• Bilinguals are better at learn-
ing two rules simultaneously be-
cause they are wired to learn
multiple rules simultaneously.
• Humans do not choose more
specific patterns.
• The model ignores work on the
executive function advantage in
bilinguals.
See Kova´cs & Mehler (2009b).
patterns when these are carried by animal vocalizations.
Experiment 1: Do human adults prefer more
specific rules?
Materials and method.
Participants Fourteen (9 females, mean age 25.4,
range 19–34) native speakers of English participated in
Experiment 1. They were recruited from the MIT com-
munity and received monetary payment in exchange for
their participation. Half of the participants were as-
signed to the AAB condition, and half to the ABB con-
dition (see below).
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Apparatus Stimuli were presented over headphones
using Psyscope X (http://psy.ck.sissa.it). Participants
were tested individually in a quiet room. Responses
were collected from pre-marked keys on the keyboard.
Stimuli During familiarization, A syllables were ga,
li, ni and ta; B syllables were gi, la, na, ti. All syllables
were pronounced by a male native speaker of Ameri-
can English. These syllables had an average duration
of 627 ms (range: 477 – 727 ms), and were combined
into AAB or ABB triplets, depending on the condition.
Syllables in triplets were separated by 200 ms silences.
This yielded 16 familiarization triplets.
During test, A syllables were wo and du, while B syl-
lables were ru and ko. All syllables were pronounced by
the same speaker as the familiarization syllables. These
syllables had an average duration of 616 ms (range:
496 – 750 ms). A vocalizations were an aggressive call
and a harmonic arch; B vocalizations were a scream and
a coo call. These vocalizations had an average duration
of 617 ms (range: 485 – 942 ms). However, I used only
the syllable triplets wo-wo-ru, du-du-ko (AAB), wo-ru-
ru, and du-ko-ko (ABB), as well as the rhesus triplets
aggressive-aggressive-scream, harmonic arch-harmonic
arch-coo (AAB), aggressive-scream-scream, and har-
monic arch-coo-coo (ABB).
Procedure Participants were informed that they
would hear some sound sequences, and were instructed
to listen to them. Following this, they were presented
with all 16 familiarization triplets played once in random
order, with a silence of 1 s between triplets. Half of the
participants were familiarized with AAB triplets, and
half with ABB triplets.
Following this familiarization, participants were in-
formed that they would hear pairs of sound sequences,
and that they would have to decide which sequence in
each pair was like the sequences they had heard before.
They were advised that there was no “trick” in the ex-
periment, and that they should just make their choices
if they seemed obvious to them. Following this, they
were presented with pairs of triplets, and had to choose
which one was ‘like’ the triplets they had heard.
Participants familiarized with AAB triplets had to
choose between AAB triplets carried by rhesus vocal-
izations, and ABB triplets carried by speech syllables.
There were four test pairs of triplets, presented twice in
different item orders. For participants familiarized with
ABB triplets, the test items were constructed similarly.
Results and discussion. As shown in Figure A1, 10
our of 14 participants chose the syllable triplets with the
incorrect repetition-pattern, while four had the opposite
preference. On average, participants significantly pre-
ferred the triplets violating the repetition-pattern (i.e.,
they chose the syllable triplets, percentage of correct
responses: M = 24.1%, SD = 34.5%), t(13) = 2.81, p =
0.015, Cohen’s d = 0.75, CI.95 = 56.0%, 95.8%. The
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Figure A1. Results of Experiments 1 and 2. Circles repre-
sent individual participants, the diamonds the sample av-
erages, and the dotted line the chance level of 50%. In
Experiment 1, participants were familiarized with syllable
triplets conforming to a repetition-pattern. Then, they had
to choose between triplets of rhesus vocalizations conform-
ing to the same pattern and triplets of syllables conforming
to a different pattern. Most participants chose the syllable
triplets even though they violated the repetition-pattern. In
Experiment 2, participants were familiarized with the same
triplets as in Experiment 1. Following this, they had to
choose between triplets of rhesus vocalization that either had
the same pattern as the familiarization items or a different
pattern. They preferred the triplets with the familiar pat-
tern.
results did not differ as a function of the familiariza-
tion pattern (i.e., AAB or ABB), F (1,12) = 1.7, p =
0.221, η2 = 0.122. Hence, most actual human learners
do not preferentially learn the most specific, hardest-
to-conform-to rule, but rather whatever happens to be
most salient to them.
However, before accepting this conclusion, it is neces-
sary to establish that participants can detect repetition-
patterns carried by rhesus vocalizations. This is tested
in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2: Do human adults detect
repetition-patterns in rhesus vocalizations?
Materials and method.
Participants Fourteen (7 females, mean age 25.6,
range 19–34) native speakers of English participated in
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Experiment 2. They were recruited from the MIT com-
munity and received monetary payment in exchange for
their participation. Half of the participants were as-
signed to the AAB condition, and half to the ABB con-
dition.
Procedure The familiarization was identical to that
in Experiment 1. The test items were triplets of rhesus
vocalizations that either conformed to an AAB pattern
or and ABB pattern.
Results and discussion. As shown in Figure A1, par-
ticipants readily choose the vocalization triplets with
the correct repetition-pattern, (M = 75.0%, SD =
26.4%), t(13) = 3.54, p = 0.004, Cohen’s d = 0.95,
CI.95 = 59.8%, 90.2%. The results did not differ as
a function of the familiarization pattern (i.e., AAB or
ABB), F (1,12) < .01, p > .999, η2p < .0001. Hence,
human adults readily discriminate repetition-patterns
when they are carried by rhesus monkey vocalizations.
Appendix B
Experiment 3: Can humans
discriminate rising from falling
contours
Participants Fourteen (9 females, mean age 25.4,
range 19–34) native speakers of English participated in
Experiment 3. They were recruited from the MIT com-
munity and received monetary payment in exchange for
their participation. Half of the participants were famil-
iarized with rising contours, and half with falling con-
tours.
Apparatus Stimuli were presented over headphones
using Psyscope X (http://psy.ck.sissa.it). Participants
were tested individually in a quiet room. Responses
were collected from pre-marked keys on the keyboard.
Stimuli The stimuli were the same piano tones as
used in Endress et al.’s (2007) Experiment 2. How-
ever, as shown in Figure 1, instead of being ar-
ranged into lowest-highest-middle and middle-highest-
lowest triplets, they were arranged into rising contours
(i.e., lowest-middle-highest) and falling contours (i.e.,
highest-middle-lowest).
There were 16 familiarization triplets and three test
triplets for each pattern. The test triplets we combined
into 9 test pairs.
Procedure The procedure and instructions were
identical to Experiments 1 and 2. Participants were
familiarized with all 16 familiarization triplets played
once in random order, with a silence of 1 s between
triplets. Half of the participants were familiarized with
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Figure B1. Results of Experiment 3. Circles represent in-
dividual participants, the diamond the sample average, and
the dotted line the chance level of 50%. In contrast to the
predictions of Frank & Tenenbaum’s (2011) model, partici-
pants readily discriminate rising from falling contours.
rising contours, and half with falling contours. Follow-
ing this, they were presented with pairs of triplets, and
had to choose which one was ‘like’ the triplets they had
heard. In each trial, one triplet had a rising contour,
and one a falling contour. The 9 test pairs were pre-
sented twice with different item orders. Test trials were
presented in random order.
Results and discussion. As shown in Figure B1, most
participants were at ceiling discriminating rising from
falling contours (percentage of correct responses: M =
88.9%, SD = 15.9%), t(13) = 9.2, p < .0001, Cohen’s
d = 2.5, CI.95 = 79.7%, 98.1%. There was no difference
between the familiarization condition (rising vs. falling),
F (1,12) = 0.5, p = 0.476, η2 = 0.043, ns. Hence, in
line with much work in music perception, participants
readily discriminate rising from falling contours.
Appendix C
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